

DU MPhil Phd in Sociology

Topic:- DU_J18_MPHIL_SOCIO_Topic01

- 1) The problem then is that of a basis for breaking through the circular stability of a zero-sum power system. The crucial point is that this can only happen if the collectivity and its members are ready to assume new binding obligations over and above those previously in force. The crucial need is to justify this extension and to transform the "sentiment" that something ought to be done into a commitment to implement the sentiment by positive action, including coercive sanctions if necessary. The crucial agency of this process seems to be leadership, precisely conceived as possessing a component analytically independent of the routine power position of office, which defines the leader as the mobilizer of justifications for policies which would not be undertaken under the circular flow assumptions.

It may be suggested that the parallel to credit creations holds with respect to time-extension as well as in other respects. The increments of effectiveness which are necessary to implement new binding policies which constitute an addition to the total burden on the collectivity cannot simply be willed into being; they require organizational changes through recombination of the factors of effectiveness, development of new agencies, procurement of personnel, new norms, and even changes in bases of legitimation. Hence leadership cannot justifiably be held responsible for effective implementation immediately, and conversely, the sources of political support must be willing to trust their leadership in the sense of not demanding immediate - by the time of the next election - "pay-off" of the power-value of their votes in their decisions dictated by their own interests.

Talcott Parsons. 1963. 'On the Concept of Political Power, in *American Philosophical Society Journal*, vol.107, no.3.

What are the organizational changes that the author is referring to? [Question ID = 2447]

1. All of these [Option ID = 9788]
2. development of new agencies, [Option ID = 9785]
3. procurement of personnel, [Option ID = 9786]
4. new norms, and changes in bases of legitimation [Option ID = 9787]

Correct Answer :-

- All of these [Option ID = 9788]

2)

The problem then is that of a basis for breaking through the circular stability of a zero-sum power system. The crucial point is that this can only happen if the collectivity and its members are ready to assume new binding obligations over and above those previously in force. The crucial need is to justify this extension and to transform the "sentiment" that something ought to be done into a commitment to implement the sentiment by positive action, including coercive sanctions if necessary. The crucial agency of this process seems to be leadership, precisely conceived as possessing a component analytically independent of the routine power position of office, which defines the leader as the mobilizer of justifications for policies which would not be undertaken under the circular flow assumptions.

It may be suggested that the parallel to credit creations holds with respect to time-extension as well as in other respects. The increments of effectiveness which are necessary to implement new binding policies which constitute an addition to the total burden on the collectivity cannot simply be willed into being; they require organizational changes through recombination of the factors of effectiveness, development of new agencies, procurement of personnel, new norms, and even changes in bases of legitimation. Hence leadership cannot justifiably be held responsible for effective implementation immediately, and conversely, the sources of political support must be willing to trust their leadership in the sense of not demanding immediate - by the time of the next election - "pay-off" of the power-value of their votes in their decisions dictated by their own interests.

Talcott Parsons. 1963. 'On the Concept of Political Power, in *American Philosophical Society Journal*, vol.107, no.3.

What can change the circular stability of a zero-sum power system?

[Question ID = 2446]

1. economic investment [Option ID = 9783]
2. administrative measures [Option ID = 9781]
3. judicial interaction [Option ID = 9784]
4. leadership independent of routine power position [Option ID = 9782]

Correct Answer :-

- leadership independent of routine power position [Option ID = 9782]

Topic:- DU_J18_MPHIL_SOCIO_Topic02

1)

The other perspective is of Indian feminist scholarship. There is now a very interesting debate on the place of judicial activism, and concomitant casting of issues in a rights framework, when it comes to securing the well-being of women in all situations. Litigation to develop more specific legal instruments, or to make bureaucratic delivery of services more accountable, is not seen by some feminists as a panacea. There is an interesting debate among feminists about the efficacy even desirability of judicial activism in securing the rights of women (Rajan 2003, 34-35). Feminist theorists and activists have questioned the wisdom of allowing liberal state ideologies to express themselves in the language carefully crafted and made legitimate by years of struggle in women's movements. Should Indian environmentalists have the same worries? Does judicial activism, relying on the enterprise and commitments of environmental justice movements, reformulate the environment question in terms enabling cooptation by the liberal state? What role can metropolitan civil society organizations play in between quality of life issues forcefully articulated by a newly assertive and growing middle class, and rights to livelihood for most poor people driven to the wall by private-public partnerships in industrial and social infrastructure?

K. Sivaramakrishnan. 2011. Environment, Law, and Democracy in India. *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 70, No. 4.

From the above passage we can definitively conclude that feminists and environmentalists: [Question ID = 2525]

1. Have the same set of concerns [Option ID = 10097]
2. Have much to learn from each other [Option ID = 10098]
3. None of these [Option ID = 10100]
4. Are both sceptical of judicial activism [Option ID = 10099]

Correct Answer :-

- None of these [Option ID = 10100]

- 2) The other perspective is of Indian feminist scholarship. There is now a very interesting debate on the place of judicial activism, and concomitant casting of issues in a rights framework, when it comes to securing the well-being of women in all situations. Litigation to develop more specific legal instruments, or to make bureaucratic delivery of services more accountable, is not seen by some feminists as a panacea. There is an interesting debate among feminists about the efficacy even desirability of judicial activism in securing the rights of women (Rajan 2003, 34-35). Feminist theorists and activists have questioned the wisdom of allowing liberal state ideologies to express themselves in the language carefully crafted and made legitimate by years of struggle in women's movements. Should Indian environmentalists have the same worries? Does judicial activism, relying on the enterprise and commitments of environmental justice movements, reformulate the environment question in terms enabling cooptation by the liberal state? What role can metropolitan civil society organizations play in between quality of life issues forcefully articulated by a newly assertive and growing middle class, and rights to livelihood for most poor people driven to the wall by private-public partnerships in industrial and social infrastructure?

K. Sivaramakrishnan. 2011. Environment, Law, and Democracy in India. *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 70, No. 4.

From the above paragraph, it can be inferred that: [Question ID = 2522]

1. The feminist movement can learn from the challenges faced by the environmental movement [Option ID = 10085]
2. The efficacy and desirability of judicial activism may be debated. [Option ID = 10087]
3. The quality of life issues of the newly assertive and growing middle class is responsible for the loss of livelihood of the poor. [Option ID = 10088]
4. Judicial activism allows the cooptation of environmentalists by the liberal state. [Option ID = 10086]

Correct Answer :-

- The efficacy and desirability of judicial activism may be debated. [Option ID = 10087]

- 3) The other perspective is of Indian feminist scholarship. There is now a very interesting debate on the place of judicial activism, and concomitant casting of issues in a rights framework, when it comes to securing the well-being of women in all situations. Litigation to develop more specific legal instruments, or to make bureaucratic delivery of services more accountable, is not seen by some feminists as a panacea. There is an interesting debate among feminists about the efficacy even desirability of judicial activism in securing the rights of women (Rajan 2003, 34-35). Feminist theorists and activists have questioned the wisdom of allowing liberal state ideologies to express themselves in the language carefully crafted and made legitimate by years of struggle in women's movements. Should Indian environmentalists have the same worries? Does judicial activism, relying on the enterprise and commitments of environmental justice movements, reformulate the environment question in terms enabling cooptation by the liberal state? What role can metropolitan civil society organizations play in between quality of life issues forcefully articulated by a newly assertive and growing middle class, and rights to livelihood for most poor people driven to the wall by private-public partnerships in industrial and social infrastructure?

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According to the above passage, judicial activism is associated with: [Question ID = 2523]

1. Development of more specific legal instruments [Option ID = 10091]
2. Reformulating the environmental question [Option ID = 10089]
3. All of these [Option ID = 10092]
4. Reframing the well being of women in a rights framework [Option ID = 10090]

Correct Answer :-

- Reframing the well being of women in a rights framework [Option ID = 10090]

- 4) The other perspective is of Indian feminist scholarship. There is now a very interesting debate on the place of judicial activism, and concomitant casting of issues in a rights framework, when it comes to securing the well-being of women in all situations. Litigation to develop more specific legal instruments, or to make bureaucratic delivery of services more accountable, is not seen by some feminists as a panacea. There is an interesting debate among feminists about the efficacy even desirability of judicial activism in securing the rights of women (Rajan 2003, 34-35). Feminist theorists and activists have questioned the wisdom of allowing liberal state ideologies to express themselves in the language carefully crafted and made legitimate by years of struggle in women's movements. Should Indian environmentalists have the same worries? Does judicial activism, relying on the enterprise and commitments of environmental justice movements, reformulate the environment question in terms enabling cooptation by the liberal state? What role can metropolitan civil society organizations play in between quality of life issues forcefully articulated by a newly assertive and growing middle class, and rights to livelihood for most poor people driven to the wall by private-public partnerships in industrial and social infrastructure?

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Which of the following should be entirely avoided according to Indian feminist scholarship?

- a. Casting of issues in a rights framework
- b. Making bureaucratic delivery of services more accountable
- c. Litigation to develop more specific legal instruments
- d. Judicial activism [Question ID = 2524]

1. a, c, and d [Option ID = 10095]

2. All of these [Option ID = 10093]
3. None of these [Option ID = 10096]
4. a and d [Option ID = 10094]

Correct Answer :-

- None of these [Option ID = 10096]

Topic:- DU_J18_MPHIL_SOCIO_Topic03

- 1) One of the first serious anthropological explorations of human rights issues was Alison Dundes Renteln's short monograph *International Human Rights* (1989). The title is slightly misleading, and the first word could well have been 'cross-cultural' since that is what the book is about. Using material from a very large database known as the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) as well as a string of ethnographic studies, Renteln asks to what extent it might be possible, on empirical grounds, to identify a shared set of moral principles common to humanity. The book argues that on the basis of existing cultural variation, such a set of common values is impossible to establish. Only in a few societies, she writes, does one have a concept covering an abstract 'humanity'. The only shared moral principle she discovers is *lex talionis*, the principle of proportionality, which states that sanctions should be proportional to the gravity of the transgression. Since transgressions are culturally defined, this conclusion amounts to stating the obvious, to put it mildly.

Renteln's findings were far from controversial or unexpected within the anthropological community. After all, one of the liveliest debates in the 1980s had concerned the concept of the person ...The topic may sound a lofty and academic one, interesting in the seminar room but worthless outside it, but universal rights presuppose a particular view of the person as an individual endowed with particular rights, so the debate has relevance beyond mere academia. For example, anthropologists sometimes distinguished between the sociocentric person, who places the community before the individual (the person has few rights and many duties), and the egocentric person, whose universe is centred on him- or herself (with few duties and wide-ranging rights). When it was shown that even the entities supposedly endowed with particular rights vary, that is persons, defending claims to universality seemed to become very difficult indeed. At the same time, not all anthropologists were equally committed to cultural relativism. Some saw it as an obstacle to the liberation of oppressed peoples, and fashioned an anthropology, sometimes Marxist but sometimes not, emphasizing that historical change and the increased integration of peoples into the global world system created an incipient common moral space within which conversations about personhood, morality and politics would become possible.

Thomas Hylland Eriksen (2014). *Global Citizenship and the Challenge from Cultural Relativism*, In Aksel Braanen Sterri (ed.), *Global citizen - challenges and responsibility in an interconnected world*. Rotterdam, Sense Publishers.

From the above passage it can be inferred that: [Question ID = 2541]

1. Human rights discourse uses notions of personhood which may be egocentric but not sociocentric. [Option ID = 10162]
2. Anthropological notion of personhood problematises the concept of abstract humanity. [Option ID = 10161]
3. Anthropological notion of personhood has contributed to the human rights discourse. [Option ID = 10164]
4. The concern with personhood is largely an academic fad. [Option ID = 10163]

Correct Answer :-

- Anthropological notion of personhood problematises the concept of abstract humanity. [Option ID = 10161]

2)

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Thomas Hylland Eriksen (2014). Global Citizenship and the Challenge from Cultural Relativism, In Aksel Braanen Sterri (ed.), *Global citizen - challenges and responsibility in an interconnected world*. Rotterdam, Sense Publishers.

Renteln's work argued that:

[Question ID = 2540]

1. *Lex talionis* should be the basis of international human rights because of its universality. [Option ID = 10157]
2. *Lex talionis* is concerned with an abstract concept of humanity. [Option ID = 10158]
3. None of these [Option ID = 10160]
4. The idea of universal human rights has very little empirical foundation. [Option ID = 10159]

Correct Answer :-

- The idea of universal human rights has very little empirical foundation. [Option ID = 10159]

3)

One of the first serious anthropological explorations of human rights issues was Alison Dundes Renteln's short monograph *International Human Rights* (1989). The title is slightly misleading, and the first word could well have been 'cross-cultural' since that is what the book is about. Using material from a very large database known as the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) as well as a string of ethnographic studies, Renteln asks to what extent it might be possible, on empirical grounds, to identify a shared set of moral principles common to humanity. The book argues that on the basis of existing cultural variation, such a set of common values is impossible to establish. Only in a few societies, she writes, does one have a concept covering an abstract 'humanity'. The only shared moral principle she discovers is *lex talionis*, the principle of proportionality, which states that sanctions should be proportional to the gravity of the transgression. Since transgressions are culturally defined, this conclusion amounts to stating the obvious, to put it mildly.

Renteln's findings were far from controversial or unexpected within the anthropological community. After all, one of the liveliest debates in the 1980s had concerned the concept of the person ...The topic may sound a lofty and academic one, interesting in the seminar room but worthless outside it, but universal rights presuppose a particular view of the person as an individual endowed with particular rights, so the debate has relevance beyond mere academia. For example, anthropologists sometimes distinguished between the sociocentric person, who places the community before the individual (the person has few rights and many duties), and the egocentric person, whose universe is centred on him- or herself (with few duties and wide-ranging rights). When it was shown that even the entities supposedly endowed with particular rights vary, that is persons, defending claims to universality seemed to become very difficult indeed. At the same time, not all anthropologists were equally committed to cultural relativism. Some saw it as an obstacle to the liberation of oppressed peoples, and fashioned an anthropology, sometimes Marxist but sometimes not, emphasizing that historical change and the increased integration of peoples into the global world system created an incipient common moral space within which conversations about personhood, morality and politics would become possible.

Thomas Hylland Eriksen (2014). *Global Citizenship and the Challenge from Cultural Relativism*, In Aksel Braanen Sterri (ed.), *Global citizen - challenges and responsibility in an interconnected world*. Rotterdam, Sense Publishers.

From the above passage it can be inferred that Renteln's findings were uncontroversial for anthropologists because:

[Question ID = 2539]

1. Anthropologists are not committed to cultural relativism. [Option ID = 10154]
2. Anthropologists have long accepted the idea of international human rights. [Option ID = 10153]
3. None of these [Option ID = 10156]
4. She focused on the concept of *the person* which has a wide currency in anthropology. [Option ID = 10155]

Correct Answer :-

- None of these [Option ID = 10156]

Topic:- DU_J18_MPHIL_SOCIO_Topic04

1)

But what is the logic, if any, that ties together these argumentations against the many historic evidences of Hindu divorce? We have seen that the denial concerning Hindu divorce elaborates four main themes: time, caste, gender, and law. All the above argumentations, very often interwoven, are related to the mainstream conceptualization of the indissolubility of Hindu marriage that substantiated the various degrees of the illegitimacy of Hindu divorce. They find their roots in the specific history and scope of Hindu law and in the opposition between law and custom: the first dictating the axiom of the indissoluble marriage and the second providing various forms of dissolution falling in the realm of custom and beyond the one of the law. Yet the exclusion of the everyday practices from the legal domain was possibly against the very essence of South Asian law, which has been characterized since ancient times by a great attention to the right balance between ruler's law and people's law. Hindu treatises emphasized the king's duty to respect people's customs, thereby attesting the relevance of a customary justice ... and the legal administration of classical and medieval India tended to recognize custom as an integral part of the legal system. Such a pragmatic approach has also been confirmed by contextual sources, i.e. drama and novels, showing that the king used his own means to achieve order and to administer justice beyond the precepts of upper caste Hindu tradition Instead, the opposition between the ideal of indissoluble marriage perceived to be the law, against forms of customary divorce bringing disrepute and loss of status was, first of all, the ideological elitist perspective of the Brahman upper caste.

Livia Holden. 2008. *Hindu divorce: A legal anthropology*, Aldershot, Ashgate

From the above passage it can be inferred that:

[Question ID = 2545]

1. There is much historical evidence which disproves the idea of indissolubility of Hindu marriage. [Option ID = 10178]
2. Illegitimacy of divorce is common due to its customary character. [Option ID = 10177]
3. All of these [Option ID = 10180]
4. The idea that divorce brings about loss of status is very common across social groups. [Option ID = 10179]

Correct Answer :-

- There is much historical evidence which disproves the idea of indissolubility of Hindu marriage. [Option ID = 10178]

2)

But what is the logic, if any, that ties together these argumentations against the many historic evidences of Hindu divorce? We have seen that the denial concerning Hindu divorce elaborates four main themes: time, caste, gender, and law. All the above argumentations, very often interwoven, are related to the mainstream conceptualization of the indissolubility of Hindu marriage that substantiated the various degrees of the illegitimacy of Hindu divorce. They find their roots in the specific history and scope of Hindu law and in the opposition between law and custom: the first dictating the axiom of the indissoluble marriage and the second providing various forms of dissolution falling in the realm of custom and beyond the one of the law. Yet the exclusion of the everyday practices from the legal domain was possibly against the very essence of South Asian law, which has been characterized since ancient times by a great attention to the right balance between ruler's law and people's law. Hindu treatises emphasized the king's duty to respect people's customs, thereby attesting the relevance of a customary justice ... and the legal administration of classical and medieval India tended to recognize custom as an integral part of the legal system. Such a pragmatic approach has also been confirmed by contextual sources, i.e. drama and novels, showing that the king used his own means to achieve order and to administer justice beyond the precepts of upper caste Hindu tradition Instead, the opposition between the ideal of indissoluble marriage perceived to be the law, against forms of customary divorce bringing disrepute and loss of status was, first of all, the ideological elitist perspective of the Brahman upper caste.

Livia Holden. 2008. *Hindu divorce: A legal anthropology*, Aldershot, Ashgate

From the above passage, it can be inferred that: [Question ID = 2543]

1. None of these [Option ID = 10172]
2. Divorce is largely unknown in Indian subcontinent. [Option ID = 10171]
3. Hindu marriages are a sacrament. [Option ID = 10170]
4. Hindu marriages have always been indissoluble. [Option ID = 10169]

Correct Answer :-

- None of these [Option ID = 10172]

- 3) But what is the logic, if any, that ties together these argumentations against the many historic evidences of Hindu divorce? We have seen that the denial concerning Hindu divorce elaborates four main themes: time, caste, gender, and law. All the above argumentations, very often interwoven, are related to the mainstream conceptualization of the indissolubility of Hindu marriage that substantiated the various degrees of the illegitimacy of Hindu divorce. They find their roots in the specific history and scope of Hindu law and in the opposition between law and custom: the first dictating the axiom of the indissoluble marriage and the second providing various forms of dissolution falling in the realm of custom and beyond the one of the law. Yet the exclusion of the everyday practices from the legal domain was possibly against the very essence of South Asian law, which has been characterized since ancient times by a great attention to the right balance between ruler's law and people's law. Hindu treatises emphasized the king's duty to respect people's customs, thereby attesting the relevance of a customary justice ... and the legal administration of classical and medieval India tended to recognize custom as an integral part of the legal system. Such a pragmatic approach has also been confirmed by contextual sources, i.e. drama and novels, showing that the king used his own means to achieve order and to administer justice beyond the precepts of upper caste Hindu tradition Instead, the opposition between the ideal of indissoluble marriage perceived to be the law, against forms of customary divorce bringing disrepute and loss of status was, first of all, the ideological elitist perspective of the Brahman upper caste.

Livia Holden. 2008. *Hindu divorce: A legal anthropology*, Aldershot, Ashgate

From the above passage it can be inferred that: [Question ID = 2544]

1. Because marriages are indissoluble among Hindus, divorce is illegitimate in various degrees. [Option ID = 10176]
2. There was a balance between the people's law and the rulers law which permitted a greater acceptability of divorce than the subsequent separation of law and custom. [Option ID = 10174]
3. Divorce was recognized by the precolonial rulers although this changed in colonial times. [Option ID = 10175]
4. Divorce is much more common in modern times than in the past and this is owing to its legal recognition. [Option ID = 10173]

Correct Answer :-

- There was a balance between the people's law and the rulers law which permitted a greater acceptability of divorce than the subsequent separation of law and custom. [Option ID = 10174]

Topic:- DU_J18_MPHIL_SOCIO_Topic05

- 1) It is part of the folk wisdom of the field that historians have been increasingly enthusiastic about new developments in the sociology of scientific knowledge while philosophers of science have remained more resistant. Certainly, there has been a marked antipathy to some forms of philosophy by sociologists. Philosophy bashing perhaps reached its apogee with Bloor's (1976: 45) comment that "to ask questions of the sort which philosophers address to themselves is usually to paralyse the mind." Since the debate between Bloor (1981) and Laudan (1981), however, some philosophers have evinced sympathy for the work of the sociology of scientific knowledge (for example, Nickles, 1982, 1984). This suggests that it is perhaps no longer productive to dismiss all attempts at philosophizing science (Knorr-Cetina, 1982a).

One good reason for not dismissing philosophy is that the positions of most authors both within and beyond the social study of science are based on deep-seated ontological commitments rather than upon any empirical account of science. This is why empirical evidence (of the sort provided by *Laboratory Life*) is unlikely to change any minds. And this is why those who read the book through realist spectacles will see error (for example, Bazerman, 1980: 17).

Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar. 1986 (1971). *Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts*. London, Sage.

Which of the following statements can be inferred from the above passage? [Question ID = 2548]

1. Some sociologists find some philosophical questions meaningless. [Option ID = 10192]
2. Sociologists have been supportive of philosophers. [Option ID = 10191]
3. Historians are not in favor of the sociology of scientific knowledge. [Option ID = 10189]
4. Philosophers of science have supported the sociology of scientific knowledge. [Option ID = 10190]

Correct Answer :-

- Some sociologists find some philosophical questions meaningless. [Option ID = 10192]

2)

It is part of the folk wisdom of the field that historians have been increasingly enthusiastic about new developments in the sociology of scientific knowledge while philosophers of science have remained more resistant. Certainly, there has been a marked antipathy to some forms of philosophy by sociologists. Philosophy bashing perhaps reached its apogee with Bloor's (1976: 45) comment that "to ask questions of the sort which philosophers address to themselves is usually to paralyse the mind." Since the debate between Bloor (1981) and Laudan (1981), however, some philosophers have evinced sympathy for the work of the sociology of scientific knowledge (for example, Nickles, 1982, 1984). This suggests that it is perhaps no longer productive to dismiss all attempts at philosophizing science (Knorr-Cetina, 1982a).

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Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar. 1986 (1971). *Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts*. London, Sage.

The author suggests that the empirical evidence in *Laboratory Life* is likely to change the minds of those who have an ontological bent of mind. [Question ID = 2547]

1. None of these is true. [Option ID = 10188]
2. The above statement is true. [Option ID = 10186]
3. The above statement is untrue. [Option ID = 10185]
4. The passage is unclear about the statement. [Option ID = 10187]

Correct Answer :-

- The above statement is untrue. [Option ID = 10185]

Topic:- DU_J18_MPHIL_SOCIO_Topic06

1)

Women's Enrolment and Total Enrolment in Professional Courses, India, 2001-02 to 2007-08								
(Enrolment figures in thousands)								
Year	Education		Engineering		Medicine		Law	
	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women
2001-02	115.3	50.1	942.4	211.7	148.3	60.2	271.0	56.0
2004-05	155.2	68.0	1085.2	252.5	256.7	89.1	319.7	68.6
2007-08	370.7	198.7	1490.6	411.6	449.3	207.8	294.0	69.2

Note: Engineering includes Polytechnic and Diploma courses. Source: University Grants Commission

Read the above table carefully and answer the questions below:

The proportionate increase in total enrolment between 2001-02 and 2004-05 is the highest:

[Question ID = 2553]

1. In Medicine. [Option ID = 10212]
2. In Education. [Option ID = 10210]

3. In Engineering. [Option ID = 10209]
 4. In Law. [Option ID = 10211]

Correct Answer :-

- In Medicine. [Option ID = 10212]

2)

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2007-08	370.7	198.7	1490.6	411.6	449.3	207.8	294.0	69.2

Note: Engineering includes Polytechnic and Diploma courses. Source: University Grants Commission

Read the above table carefully and answer the questions below:

The increase in the share of women in total enrolment between 2004-05 and 2007-08 is the highest:

[Question ID = 2552]

1. In Medicine and Law. [Option ID = 10207]
2. In Education and Medicine. [Option ID = 10208]
3. In Education and Engineering. [Option ID = 10206]
4. In Engineering and Law. [Option ID = 10205]

Correct Answer :-

- In Education and Medicine. [Option ID = 10208]

3)

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(Enrolment figures in thousands)								
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2007-08	370.7	198.7	1490.6	411.6	449.3	207.8	294.0	69.2

Note: Engineering includes Polytechnic and Diploma courses. Source: University Grants Commission

Read the above table carefully and answer the questions below:

Which of these statements is false?

[Question ID = 2550]

1. Women's enrolment in all four faculties has been increasing continuously over the three years. [Option ID = 10197]
2. Engineering has always had more women enrolled than any other faculty. [Option ID = 10199]
3. Total enrolment in all four faculties has been increasing continuously over the three years. [Option ID = 10198]
4. The faculty with the second highest number of women enrolled is the same in all three years. [Option ID = 10200]

Correct Answer :-

- Total enrolment in all four faculties has been increasing continuously over the three years. [Option ID = 10198]

4)

Women's Enrolment and Total Enrolment in Professional Courses, India, 2001-02 to 2007-08								
(Enrolment figures in thousands)								
Year	Education		Engineering		Medicine		Law	
	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women
2001-02	115.3	50.1	942.4	211.7	148.3	60.2	271.0	56.0
2004-05	155.2	68.0	1085.2	252.5	256.7	89.1	319.7	68.6
2007-08	370.7	198.7	1490.6	411.6	449.3	207.8	294.0	69.2

Note: Engineering includes Polytechnic and Diploma courses. Source: University Grants Commission

Read the above table carefully and answer the questions below:

Which of these statements is true?

[Question ID = 2551]

1. Women's *share* in total enrolment is the highest in Education except in 2007-08. [Option ID = 10202]
2. Women's *share* in total enrolment is the highest in Education except in 2001-02. [Option ID = 10203]
3. Women's *share* in total enrolment is the highest in Education in all the three years. [Option ID = 10201]
4. Women's *share* in total enrolment is the highest in Education only in 2004-05. [Option ID = 10204]

Correct Answer :-

- Women's *share* in total enrolment is the highest in Education except in 2007-08. [Option ID = 10202]

5)

Women's Enrolment and Total Enrolment in Professional Courses, India, 2001-02 to 2007-08								
(Enrolment figures in thousands)								
Year	Education		Engineering		Medicine		Law	
	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women
2001-02	115.3	50.1	942.4	211.7	148.3	60.2	271.0	56.0
2004-05	155.2	68.0	1085.2	252.5	256.7	89.1	319.7	68.6
2007-08	370.7	198.7	1490.6	411.6	449.3	207.8	294.0	69.2

Note: Engineering includes Polytechnic and Diploma courses. Source: University Grants Commission

Read the above table carefully and answer the questions below:

The table suggests that male domination (in terms of numbers) has been the greatest in: [Question ID = 2554]

1. The table does not provide any information on men's enrolment. [Option ID = 10216]
2. Engineering and Medicine. [Option ID = 10213]

3. Engineering and Law. [Option ID = 10215]
4. Medicine and Law. [Option ID = 10214]

Correct Answer :-

- Engineering and Law. [Option ID = 10215]

Topic:- DU_J18_MPHIL_SOCIO_Topic07

- 1) In the mid-twentieth century, actors in various positions throughout Latin America predicted that indigenous identification would fade away as modern development created national citizens. Not only had governments tried hard to develop non-indigenous modern citizens, but after centuries in which individuals labeled “Indian” and “African” were legally, economically and socially discriminated, people found all kinds of ways to evade these identities. Many observers – from scholars to political leaders to National Geographic magazine – declared that “Indians were disappearing.” Observing Bolivian life in the 1980s, anthropologist Thomas Abercrombie (1992: 96) wrote that, given their advantage in force, it is not surprising that aspects of the colonizers’ value systems have become hegemonic, so that the stigma attached long ago by Europeans to “Indianness” has worked its way into “Indian” selfconsciousness as well. Consequently, self-proclaimed Indians are exceedingly scarce. Donna Van Cott (2003: 755) calculates that throughout the twentieth century, although the majority of the Bolivian population spoke indigenous languages as their mother tongue, no more than 2.7 percent of the populace ever voted for indigenous-identified political parties in a national election. The following section traces aspects of radical changes leading up to the 2005 election of indigenous-identified Evo Morales as president of Bolivia.

S. Paulson. 2012. Land Claims. Racialized Environmental Struggles in Latin America. Pin Alf Hornborg, Brett Clark, and Kenneth Hermele (eds.) *Ecology and Power Struggles over land and material resources in the past, present, and future*. New York, Routledge.

Many observers were declaring that “Indians were disappearing” because:

[Question ID = 2556]

1. No more than 2.7 percent of the populace ever voted. [Option ID = 10222]
2. Few Indians were self-identifying as Indians. [Option ID = 10224]
3. Modernity is a force that destroys identity. [Option ID = 10223]
4. Colonizer’s value systems had not become hegemonic. [Option ID = 10221]

Correct Answer :-

- Few Indians were self-identifying as Indians. [Option ID = 10224]

2)

In the mid-twentieth century, actors in various positions throughout Latin America predicted that indigenous identification would fade away as modern development created national citizens. Not only had governments tried hard to develop non-indigenous modern citizens, but after centuries in which individuals labeled “Indian” and “African” were legally, economically and socially discriminated, people found all kinds of ways to evade these identities. Many observers – from scholars to political leaders to National Geographic magazine – declared that “Indians were disappearing.” Observing Bolivian life in the 1980s, anthropologist Thomas Abercrombie (1992: 96) wrote that, given their advantage in force, it is not surprising that aspects of the colonizers’ value systems have become hegemonic, so that the stigma attached long ago by Europeans to “Indianness” has worked its way into “Indian” selfconsciousness as well. Consequently, self-proclaimed Indians are exceedingly scarce. Donna Van Cott (2003: 755) calculates that throughout the twentieth century, although the majority of the Bolivian population spoke indigenous languages as their mother tongue, no more than 2.7 percent of the populace ever voted for indigenous-identified political parties in a national election. The following section traces aspects of radical changes leading up to the 2005 election of indigenous-identified Evo Morales as president of Bolivia.

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From the above passage it can be definitively concluded that:

[Question ID = 2557]

1. Anthropologists were wrong about Indians disappearing. [Option ID = 10226]
2. Evo Morales was the first indigenous president of Bolivia. [Option ID = 10225]
3. None of these [Option ID = 10228]
4. National citizenship and indigenous identity contradict each other. [Option ID = 10227]

Correct Answer :-

- None of these [Option ID = 10228]

- 3) In the mid-twentieth century, actors in various positions throughout Latin America predicted that indigenous identification would fade away as modern development created national citizens. Not only had governments tried hard to develop non-indigenous modern citizens, but after centuries in which individuals labeled “Indian” and “African” were legally, economically and socially discriminated, people found all kinds of ways to evade these identities. Many observers – from scholars to political leaders to National Geographic magazine – declared that “Indians were disappearing.” Observing Bolivian life in the 1980s, anthropologist Thomas Abercrombie (1992: 96) wrote that, given their advantage in force, it is not surprising that aspects of the colonizers’ value systems have become hegemonic, so that the stigma attached long ago by Europeans to “Indianness” has worked its way into “Indian” selfconsciousness as well. Consequently, self-proclaimed Indians are exceedingly scarce. Donna Van Cott (2003: 755) calculates that throughout the twentieth century, although the majority of the Bolivian population spoke indigenous languages as their mother tongue, no more than 2.7 percent of the populace ever voted for indigenous-identified political parties in a national election. The following section traces aspects of radical changes leading up to the 2005 election of indigenous-identified Evo Morales as president of Bolivia.

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It can be inferred from the above passage that:

[Question ID = 2558]

1. Indigenous identity existed in Bolivia even in the twentieth century when it was not publicly asserted. [Option ID = 10231]
2. Bolivian national elections do not allow for Indian identity to be asserted. [Option ID = 10230]
3. Evo Morales was elected president of Bolivia because of his indigenous identity. [Option ID = 10232]
4. 'Indian' and 'African' identities are unclear in Bolivian public life. [Option ID = 10229]

Correct Answer :-

- Indigenous identity existed in Bolivia even in the twentieth century when it was not publicly asserted. [Option ID = 10231]

Topic:- DU_J18_MPHIL_SOCIO_Topic08

- 1) In emphasizing material flows, ecologically unequal exchange problematizes localized analyses of sustainability and environmental improvement or degradation that lack connectivities to broader regional and global contexts. Given the global reach of interdependencies and commodity chains, how might we reasonably understand the sustainability of one place, unless through thorough consideration of the multitude of material flows upon which the metabolism of the place depends? Extractive and productive activities in a central place or core metropolitan region result in a set of ecological consequences for that territory. The set of ecological consequences of total consumption in the same place will, however, be considerably greater, as much of what is consumed is extracted or produced elsewhere. At the other end, in the global periphery, environmental loads and degradation are often greater than what corresponds to consumption.

Eric Clark and Huei-Min Tsai 2012. Islands: ecologically unequal exchange and landesque capital. In (eds.) Alf Hornborg, Brett Clark, and Kenneth Hermele *Ecology and Power Struggles over land and material resources in the past, present, and future*. New York, Routledge.

The central argument of this passage is about the:

[Question ID = 2560]

1. relationship between core and periphery. [Option ID = 10239]
2. ecological consequences of total consumption. [Option ID = 10237]
3. struggles over material flows. [Option ID = 10240]
4. scale of analysis of ecological sustainability. [Option ID = 10238]

Correct Answer :-

- scale of analysis of ecological sustainability. [Option ID = 10238]

2)

In emphasizing material flows, ecologically unequal exchange problematizes localized analyses of sustainability and environmental improvement or degradation that lack connectivities to broader regional and global contexts. Given the global reach of interdependencies and commodity chains, how might we reasonably understand the sustainability of one place, unless through thorough consideration of the multitude of material flows upon which the metabolism of the place depends? Extractive and productive activities in a central place or core metropolitan region result in a set of ecological consequences for that territory. The set of ecological consequences of total consumption in the same place will, however, be considerably greater, as much of what is consumed is extracted or produced elsewhere. At the other end, in the global periphery, environmental loads and degradation are often greater than what corresponds to consumption.

Eric Clark and Huei-Min Tsai 2012. Islands: ecologically unequal exchange and landesque capital. In (eds.) Alf Hornborg, Brett Clark, and Kenneth Hermele *Ecology and Power Struggles over land and material resources in the past, present, and future*. New York, Routledge.

The relation between consumption and environmental degradation:

[Question ID = 2561]

1. is inversely related in core and periphery. [Option ID = 10241]
2. cannot be understood within narrow territorial limits. [Option ID = 10242]
3. cannot be measured accurately. [Option ID = 10244]
4. is achieved through global interdependencies and commodity chains. [Option ID = 10243]

Correct Answer :-

- cannot be understood within narrow territorial limits. [Option ID = 10242]

- 3) In emphasizing material flows, ecologically unequal exchange problematizes localized analyses of sustainability and environmental improvement or degradation that lack connectivities to broader regional and global contexts. Given the global reach of interdependencies and commodity chains, how might we reasonably understand the sustainability of one place, unless through thorough consideration of the multitude of material flows upon which the metabolism of the place depends? Extractive and productive activities in a central place or core metropolitan region result in a set of ecological consequences for that territory. The set of ecological consequences of total consumption in the same place will, however, be considerably greater, as much of what is consumed is extracted or produced elsewhere. At the other end, in the global periphery, environmental loads and degradation are often greater than what corresponds to consumption.

Eric Clark and Huei-Min Tsai 2012. Islands: ecologically unequal exchange and landesque capital. In (eds.) Alf Hornborg, Brett Clark, and Kenneth Hermele *Ecology and Power Struggles over land and material resources in the past, present, and future*. New York, Routledge.

The passage suggests that without an emphasis on material flows:

[Question ID = 2562]

1. Consequences of consumption may be underestimated in the periphery. [Option ID = 10247]
2. Consequences of consumption may be underestimated in core regions. [Option ID = 10245]
3. Consequences of consumption may be overestimated in core regions. [Option ID = 10246]
4. Consequences of consumption may be overestimated in the periphery. [Option ID = 10248]

Correct Answer :-

- Consequences of consumption may be underestimated in core regions. [Option ID = 10245]

Topic:- DU_J18_MPHIL_SOCIO_Topic09

1) The edition of the Mahabharata used for the sketches which follow is called the 'critical' edition of the Mahabharata, published by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute of Poona. This edition represents the result of an international undertaking supported by the Indian and foreign governments in which Indian and foreign scholars worked for several years. Before this edition was brought out there were in printed form different versions of the Mahabharata in Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Andhra and Kerala based on manuscripts found in each area. For the critical edition all the extant manuscripts were collected and compared. The oldest manuscript dating to no earlier than the 10th century A.D. was found in Kashmir, written on birch bark. After comparison of these, a short Javanese version, and the commentaries on the Mahabharata, a text was constituted in such a way that what appeared to be common to all manuscripts was published as the oldest text and what appeared in other manuscript traditions was relegated to appendices. A Kashmiri version in most cases seemed to be the oldest but it was not extant for the whole of the Mahabharata and in some rare cases the other manuscripts seemed to have preserved an older tradition. The redundant parts contain hundreds of verses and so the text of the critical edition is smaller in almost all cases than any of the individual manuscripts. In this endeavour much extraneous matter goes out and in the process a text has emerged which seems to be more consistent than any previous text. The narrative also has gained in force and speed.

This edition however constitutes only the very first attempt at a critical survey based entirely on the scrutiny of manuscripts of an old text. It still contains within its body obvious redundancies and contradictions which are discernible even to a lay reader like the present author. To give only a few examples: (1) The critical text has two distinct beginnings of the story of which one is obviously a later addition.

Irawati Karve. 2008 *Yuganta*. New Delhi, Disha Books

The critical edition of the Mahabharat was compiled by:

[Question ID = 2564]

1. Choosing a text which is internally consistent. [Option ID = 10255]
2. Finding the oldest extant text and terming it the critical edition. [Option ID = 10253]
3. None of these [Option ID = 10256]
4. Comparing existing manuscripts and taking what is common to them all as the oldest text. [Option ID = 10254]

Correct Answer :-

- Comparing existing manuscripts and taking what is common to them all as the oldest text. [Option ID = 10254]

2)

The edition of the Mahabharata used for the sketches which follow is called the 'critical' edition of the Mahabharata, published by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute of Poona. This edition represents the result of an international undertaking supported by the Indian and foreign governments in which Indian and foreign scholars worked for several years. Before this edition was brought out there were in printed form different versions of the Mahabharata in Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Andhra and Kerala based on manuscripts found in each area. For the critical edition all the extant manuscripts were collected and compared. The oldest manuscript dating to no earlier than the 10th century A.D. was found in Kashmir, written on birch bark. After comparison of these, a short Javanese version, and the commentaries on the Mahabharata, a text was constituted in such a way that what appeared to be common to all manuscripts was published as the oldest text and what appeared in other manuscript traditions was relegated to appendices. A Kashmiri version in most cases seemed to be the oldest but it was not extant for the whole of the Mahabharata and in some rare cases the other manuscripts seemed to have preserved an older tradition. The redundant parts contain hundreds of verses and so the text of the critical edition is smaller in almost all cases than any of the individual manuscripts. In this endeavour much extraneous matter goes out and in the process a text has emerged which seems to be more consistent than any previous text. The narrative also has gained in force and speed.

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Irawati Karve. 2008 *Yuganta*. New Delhi, Disha Books

The task of compiling the critical edition was undertaken by:

[Question ID = 2565]

1. Indian scholars and foreign scholars in collaboration. [Option ID = 10259]
2. the Government of India, Ancient Epics Publication Division. [Option ID = 10258]
3. scholars based at the Bhandarkar Oriental Institute in Pune. [Option ID = 10257]
4. None of these [Option ID = 10260]

Correct Answer :-

- Indian scholars and foreign scholars in collaboration. [Option ID = 10259]

3)

The edition of the Mahabharata used for the sketches which follow is called the 'critical' edition of the Mahabharata, published by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute of Poona. This edition represents the result of an international undertaking supported by the Indian and foreign governments in which Indian and foreign scholars worked for several years. Before this edition was brought out there were in printed form different versions of the Mahabharata in Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Andhra and Kerala based on manuscripts found in each area. For the critical edition all the extant manuscripts were collected and compared. The oldest manuscript dating to no earlier than the 10th century A.D. was found in Kashmir, written on birch bark. After comparison of these, a short Javanese version, and the commentaries on the Mahabharata, a text was constituted in such a way that what appeared to be common to all manuscripts was published as the oldest text and what appeared in other manuscript traditions was relegated to appendices. A Kashmiri version in most cases seemed to be the oldest but it was not extant for the whole of the Mahabharata and in some rare cases the other manuscripts seemed to have preserved an older tradition. The redundant parts contain hundreds of verses and so the text of the critical edition is smaller in almost all cases than any of the individual manuscripts. In this endeavour much extraneous matter goes out and in the process a text has emerged which seems to be more consistent than any previous text. The narrative also has gained in force and speed.

This edition however constitutes only the very first attempt at a critical survey based entirely on the scrutiny of manuscripts of an old text. It still contains within its body obvious redundancies and contradictions which are discernible even to a lay reader like the present author. To give only a few examples: (1) The critical text has two distinct beginnings of the story of which one is obviously a later addition.

Irawati Karve. 2008 *Yuganta*. New Delhi, Disha Books

Which of the following statements is correct according to the passage:

[Question ID = 2566]

1. A 10th century Kashmiri manuscript appears to be the oldest extant one for the most part. [Option ID = 10263]
2. There are manuscripts of the Mahabharat only in Bengali, Hindi, Marathi, Telugu and Malyalam. [Option ID = 10262]
3. None of these [Option ID = 10264]
4. The Mahabharat has many versions, but only the version published by the Gita Press is right. [Option ID = 10261]

Correct Answer :-

- None of these [Option ID = 10264]

4)

The edition of the Mahabharata used for the sketches which follow is called the 'critical' edition of the Mahabharata, published by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute of Poona. This edition represents the result of an international undertaking supported by the Indian and foreign governments in which Indian and foreign scholars worked for several years. Before this edition was brought out there were in printed form different versions of the Mahabharata in Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Andhra and Kerala based on manuscripts found in each area. For the critical edition all the extant manuscripts were collected and compared. The oldest manuscript dating to no earlier than the 10th century A.D. was found in Kashmir, written on birch bark. After comparison of these, a short Javanese version, and the commentaries on the Mahabharata, a text was constituted in such a way that what appeared to be common to all manuscripts was published as the oldest text and what appeared in other manuscript traditions was relegated to appendices. A Kashmiri version in most cases seemed to be the oldest but it was not extant for the whole of the Mahabharata and in some rare cases the other manuscripts seemed to have preserved an older tradition. The redundant parts contain hundreds of verses and so the text of the critical edition is smaller in almost all cases than any of the individual manuscripts. In this endeavour much extraneous matter goes out and in the process a text has emerged which seems to be more consistent than any previous text. The narrative also has gained in force and speed.

This edition however constitutes only the very first attempt at a critical survey based entirely on the scrutiny of manuscripts of an old text. It still contains within its body obvious redundancies and contradictions which are discernible even to a lay reader like the present author. To give only a few examples: (1) The critical text has two distinct beginnings of the story of which one is obviously a later addition.

Irawati Karve. 2008 *Yuganta*. New Delhi, Disha Books

Which of the following statements is false based on what the author tells us

[Question ID = 2567]

1. All of these [Option ID = 10268]
2. The two versions which begin the story are both equally plausible as the oldest version and have therefore been included. [Option ID = 10267]
3. The critical edition has managed to achieve almost total internal consistency. [Option ID = 10265]
4. The critical edition is much longer than all the editions because it includes all the variations. [Option ID = 10266]

Correct Answer :-

- All of these [Option ID = 10268]

Topic:- DU_J18_MPHIL_SOCIO_Topic10

1)

A battle over the living past is going on at present in Germany. This Historikerstreit, as they call it, concerns the question: Is the Nazi extermination of the Jews unique or not? The German historian Ernst Nolte has called "the so-called extermination of the Jews by the Third Reich" "a reaction or a distorted copy and not an original action?" The original was, according to Nolte, the extermination of the Kulaks in the Soviet Union and Stalin's purges in the 1930s. They were what Hitler copied.

The idea that the extermination of the Kulaks caused the extermination of the Jews seems to have been abandoned, and many people emphasize that all historical events are unique and not copies of each other. But they can be compared. Thus both likenesses and differences arise between the extermination of the Jews and other mass murders, from the massacre of the Armenians at the beginning of the 1900s to the more recent atrocities of Pol Pot.

But in this debate no one mentions the German extermination of the Herero people in southwest Africa during Hitler's childhood. No one mentions the corresponding genocide by the French, the British, or the Americans. No one points out that during Hitler's childhood, a major element in the European view of mankind was the conviction that "inferior races" were by nature condemned to extinction: the true compassion of the superior races consisted in helping them on the way.

German historians participating in this debate seem to look in the same direction. None looks to the west. But Hitler did. What Hitler wished to create when he sought Lebensraum in the east was a continental equivalent of the British Empire. It was in the British and other western European peoples that he found the models, of which the extermination of the Jews is, in Nolte's words, "a distorted copy?"

Sven Lindquist. 2007. *Exterminate the Brutes*. The New Press.

According to the author, Hitler's model for extermination was:

[Question ID = 2569]

1. British, French and other European treatment of natives in their colonies. [Option ID = 10276]
2. Massacre of Armenians in the 1900s. [Option ID = 10274]
3. German extermination of Herero peoples. [Option ID = 10275]
4. Stalin's purge of Kulaks. [Option ID = 10273]

Correct Answer :-

- British, French and other European treatment of natives in their colonies. [Option ID = 10276]

2)

A battle over the living past is going on at present in Germany. This Historikerstreit, as they call it, concerns the question: Is the Nazi extermination of the Jews unique or not? The German historian Ernst Nolte has called "the so-called extermination of the Jews by the Third Reich" "a reaction or a distorted copy and not an original action." The original was, according to Nolte, the extermination of the Kulaks in the Soviet Union and Stalin's purges in the 1930s. They were what Hitler copied.

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Sven Lindquist. 2007. *Exterminate the Brutes*. The New Press.

According to the author,

[Question ID = 2570]

1. the holocaust is an exact copy of other genocides. [Option ID = 10277]
2. all historical events are unique. [Option ID = 10278]
3. all genocides are both unique and comparable. [Option ID = 10279]
4. None of these [Option ID = 10280]

Correct Answer :-

- all genocides are both unique and comparable. [Option ID = 10279]

Topic:- DU_J18_MPHIL_SOCIO_Topic11

1)

"I didn't even cry on my wedding day. Everybody said, 'Why didn't you cry?' I said I was going to come back to England. He should be crying – he's leaving his house" (Asma, married to her first cousin Tahir [MZS]).

As her husband was going to leave Pakistan and his natal home to join her in Bristol, whilst she would be returning to the bosom of her family, Tahir's wife Asma saw no reason to follow convention and grieve at her *rukhsati* (the final ritual of the wedding day, when the bride leaves her parents to go to her husband's house). Her statement makes the connection described frequently by women during the course of my research between marriage, migration, and emotional loss (cf. Bradby 2000; Jeffery & Jeffery 1996; Raheja & Gold 1994). Whilst this is conventionally the experience of the bride, Asma points out that in this case it is her husband who will suffer the losses of migration, although he would not be expected to publicize these 'female' emotions in a show of tears for the wedding guests. Interviewing Tahir revealed that his migration to Britain had indeed been traumatic. A university graduate hoping for a professional career, he had held a series of arduous manual jobs before securing processing work that, while repetitive and low status, was at least relatively comfortable. However, in addition to these work and status-related challenges, Tahir also spoke of the difficulties that he had experienced adjusting to his wife's family. Marriage entails new kinship relationships and statuses, not just for the bride and groom, but also in the wider field of new affines. In both the academic literature and among those with whom I worked, it is the relations which marriage forges between women that are most commonly discussed, with strong stereotypes of the overbearing mother-in-law, jealous sister-in-law, and vulnerable new bride.

The reason for this gendered discourse lies in conventional patri-virilocal residence patterns – as a bride goes to live in her husband's family home, the nature of her relationships with his relatives are of fundamental importance to the quality of her married life. the *ghar jamai/ghar damad* is also the subject of stereotypes, generally considered to be an undesirable position with its connotations of being, like the conventional daughter-in-law, dependent on and subservient to the in-laws.

Katharine Charsley. 2005. "Unhappy Husbands: Masculinity and Migration in Transnational Pakistani Marriages." *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 11, no. 1.

Transnational families:

[Question ID = 2574]

1. import husbands for their daughters. [Option ID = 10293]
2. reinforce and subvert kinship structures. [Option ID = 10297]
3. All of these [Option ID = 10299]
4. want spouses from the homeland for their children. [Option ID = 10295]

Correct Answer :-

- All of these [Option ID = 10299]

2)

"I didn't even cry on my wedding day. Everybody said, 'Why didn't you cry?' I said I was going to come back to England. He should be crying – he's leaving his house" (Asma, married to her first cousin Tahir [MZS]).

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Katharine Charsley. 2005. "Unhappy Husbands: Masculinity and Migration in Transnational Pakistani Marriages." *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 11, no. 1.

In the passage, which of the following is suggested:

[Question ID = 2577]

1. A *ghar damad* is a valued member in his marital home. [Option ID = 10308]
2. A *ghar damad* is a necessary outcome of migration. [Option ID = 10304]
3. A *ghar damad* loses his status in his parental home. [Option ID = 10306]
4. A *ghar damad* is a powerless figure in his marital home. [Option ID = 10302]

Correct Answer :-

- A *ghar damad* is a powerless figure in his marital home. [Option ID = 10302]

3)

"I didn't even cry on my wedding day. Everybody said, 'Why didn't you cry?' I said I was going to come back to England. He should be crying – he's leaving his house" (Asma, married to her first cousin Tahir [MZS]).

As her husband was going to leave Pakistan and his natal home to join her in Bristol, whilst she would be returning to the bosom of her family, Tahir's wife Asma saw no reason to follow convention and grieve at her *rukhsati* (the final ritual of the wedding day, when the bride leaves her parents to go to her husband's house). Her statement makes the connection described frequently by women during the course of my research between marriage, migration, and emotional loss (cf. Bradby 2000; Jeffery & Jeffery 1996; Raheja & Gold 1994). Whilst this is conventionally the experience of the bride, Asma points out that in this case it is her husband who will suffer the losses of migration, although he would not be expected to publicize these 'female' emotions in a show of tears for the wedding guests. Interviewing Tahir revealed that his migration to Britain had indeed been traumatic. A university graduate hoping for a professional career, he had held a series of arduous manual jobs before securing processing work that, while repetitive and low status, was at least relatively comfortable. However, in addition to these work and status-related challenges, Tahir also spoke of the difficulties that he had experienced adjusting to his wife's family. Marriage entails new kinship relationships and statuses, not just for the bride and groom, but also in the wider field of new affines. In both the academic literature and among those with whom I worked, it is the relations which marriage forges between women that are most commonly discussed, with strong stereotypes of the overbearing mother-in-law, jealous sister-in-law, and vulnerable new bride.

The reason for this gendered discourse lies in conventional patri-virilocal residence patterns – as a bride goes to live in her husband's family home, the nature of her relationships with his relatives are of fundamental importance to the quality of her married life. the *ghar jamai/ghar damad* is also the subject of stereotypes, generally considered to be an undesirable position with its connotations of being, like the conventional daughter-in-law, dependent on and subservient to the in-laws.

Katharine Charsley. 2005. "Unhappy Husbands: Masculinity and Migration in Transnational Pakistani Marriages." *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 11, no. 1.

Asma refused to cry at her wedding:

[Question ID = 2572]

1. Asma thought her new husband should cry at their wedding. [Option ID = 10288]
2. because she would remain in her natal home. [Option ID = 10287]
3. because she was marrying the man of her choice. [Option ID = 10285]
4. because she was an unconventional girl. [Option ID = 10286]

Correct Answer :-

- because she would remain in her natal home. [Option ID = 10287]

Topic:- DU_J18_MPHIL_SOCIO_Topic12

1)

It is impossible to understand what rights are without having a sense of their development over time, but the goal here is to bring current controversies into focus, and to indicate the likely direction of further discussion about the proper role of rights in our moral and political thinking. The most important of these controversies have been taking place on two planes: one plane being that of global politics and political philosophy in the widest sense, the other being a narrower plane on which legal philosophers have investigated the logic of the concept of rights. My aim has been to discuss the substantive concerns of political philosophy and the conceptual concerns of legal philosophy in a way that illuminates both.

One particular matter I hope this method illuminates has to do with understanding two different, though related, functions of rights – that is, rights as prohibitions and, contrastingly, rights as permissions. The former role of rights has predominated in traditional discussion: rights serve to endow individuals with a kind of “moral armor” protecting them from encroachments by political authority. The latter role, rights as permissions, emphasizes the importance of the moral “breathing room” that rights allow the individual, in which she may pursue projects of her own choosing, whether or not these are responsive to the demands that morality would otherwise impose upon her. The individual’s antagonist here is not political authority so much as it is morality itself. In the former role, rights prohibit others from doing things to the individual for any reason whatever; in the latter, rights permit the individual to ignore demands that would be made of her from a disinterested moral viewpoint.

William A. Edmundson. 2004. *An Introduction to Rights*. Cambridge University Press.

How does the author expect to discuss the question of rights? [Question ID = 2626]

1. As a development over time. [Option ID = 10501]
2. The role of moral and political rights. [Option ID = 10503]
3. The development of controversies over time. [Option ID = 10502]
4. To discuss current controversies about rights. [Option ID = 10504]

Correct Answer :-

- To discuss current controversies about rights. [Option ID = 10504]

2)

It is impossible to understand what rights are without having a sense of their development over time, but the goal here is to bring current controversies into focus, and to indicate the likely direction of further discussion about the proper role of rights in our moral and political thinking. The most important of these controversies have been taking place on two planes: one plane being that of global politics and political philosophy in the widest sense, the other being a narrower plane on which legal philosophers have investigated the logic of the concept of rights. My aim has been to discuss the substantive concerns of political philosophy and the conceptual concerns of legal philosophy in a way that illuminates both.

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William A. Edmundson. 2004. *An Introduction to Rights*. Cambridge University Press.

If ‘rights as prohibitions’ are compared to ‘rights as permissions’, which of the following statement is true? [Question ID = 2630]

1. Permissions do not involve moral authority. [Option ID = 10520]
2. Both involve a relationship with moral authority. [Option ID = 10518]
3. Both involve political authority. [Option ID = 10517]
4. Prohibitions are not about moral authority. [Option ID = 10519]

Correct Answer :-

- Both involve a relationship with moral authority. [Option ID = 10518]

3)

It is impossible to understand what rights are without having a sense of their development over time, but the goal here is to bring current controversies into focus, and to indicate the likely direction of further discussion about the proper role of rights in our moral and political thinking. The most important of these controversies have been taking place on two planes: one plane being that of global politics and political philosophy in the widest sense, the other being a narrower plane on which legal philosophers have investigated the logic of the concept of rights. My aim has been to discuss the substantive concerns of political philosophy and the conceptual concerns of legal philosophy in a way that illuminates both.

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William A. Edmundson. 2004. *An Introduction to Rights*. Cambridge University Press.

Which of the following statements is most likely to be true? [Question ID = 2629]

1. The passage is a discussion on the study of rights. [Option ID = 10513]
2. The passage is a discussion on moral philosophy. [Option ID = 10514]
3. The passage is a discussion on global politics. [Option ID = 10515]
4. The passage is a discussion on political authorities. [Option ID = 10516]

Correct Answer :-

- The passage is a discussion on the study of rights. [Option ID = 10513]

4)

It is impossible to understand what rights are without having a sense of their development over time, but the goal here is to bring current controversies into focus, and to indicate the likely direction of further discussion about the proper role of rights in our moral and political thinking. The most important of these controversies have been taking place on two planes: one plane being that of global politics and political philosophy in the widest sense, the other being a narrower plane on which legal philosophers have investigated the logic of the concept of rights. My aim has been to discuss the substantive concerns of political philosophy and the conceptual concerns of legal philosophy in a way that illuminates both.

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William A. Edmundson. 2004. *An Introduction to Rights*. Cambridge University Press.

Which role of rights has predominated in 'traditional discussions'?

[Question ID = 2628]

1. Rights that allow persons to pursue projects of their own choosing. [Option ID = 10509]
2. Rights that protect individual from encroachments by political authorities. [Option ID = 10510]
3. Rights that allow 'moral armor' rather than 'moral breathing room'. [Option ID = 10511]
4. Rights that allow 'moral breathing room' rather than 'moral armor'. [Option ID = 10512]

Correct Answer :-

- Rights that allow 'moral armor' rather than 'moral breathing room'. [Option ID = 10511]

5)

It is impossible to understand what rights are without having a sense of their development over time, but the goal here is to bring current controversies into focus, and to indicate the likely direction of further discussion about the proper role of rights in our moral and political thinking. The most important of these controversies have been taking place on two planes: one plane being that of global politics and political philosophy in the widest sense, the other being a narrower plane on which legal philosophers have investigated the logic of the concept of rights. My aim has been to discuss the substantive concerns of political philosophy and the conceptual concerns of legal philosophy in a way that illuminates both.

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William A. Edmundson. 2004. *An Introduction to Rights*. Cambridge University Press.

What, according to the author, are the most important controversies?

[Question ID = 2627]

1. Global politics, political philosophy and the concept of rights. [Option ID = 10507]
2. Global politics and political philosophy. [Option ID = 10505]
3. Substantive legal philosophy and conceptual political philosophy. [Option ID = 10508]
4. Rights as permissions and rights as prohibitions. [Option ID = 10506]

Correct Answer :-

- Global politics, political philosophy and the concept of rights. [Option ID = 10507]

Topic:- DU_J18_MPHIL_SOCIO_Topic13

1)

The dominant image of the rule of law, we argue, is false historically and in the present, because it does not fully acknowledge its dark side. The false representation starts from the idea that good law (which others “lack”) is autonomous, separate from society and its institutions, technical, non-political, non-distributive, and reactive rather than proactive: more succinctly, a technological framework for an “efficient” market. Because of these false representations, good governance that ostensibly characterizes the law’s purposes becomes the backbone of naturalized professional arguments that are marshaled to legitimize plunder.

We argue that the rule of law has a bright and a dark side, with the latter progressively conquering new terrain whenever the former is not empowered by a political soul. In the absence of such political life, the rule of law becomes a cold technology, and the dark side can cover the whole picture as law yields to embrace brute violence. The political empowerment of the bright side of law can stem from a variety of places, not necessarily rooted in justice. During the Cold War, for example, there was some incentive to practice a democratic rule of law in its positive functions of order, conflict management, principled and fair decision-making. But the change in the balance of power after the Cold War nourished the law’s dark side, removing the political bite to the law. The United States’ ruling elite no longer needed to persuade other countries and people of the values of democracy and the virtue of the rule of law which after communism, in its Soviet realization, had collapsed under corruption and illegality. Gradually, incentives for institutional virtues declined in the West. A public shift from justice to profit, from respect to thefts, followed within an atmosphere of silenced political debate, overwhelmed by self-congratulatory rhetoric, such as the end of history, through the 1990s.

Ugo Matei and Laura Nader 2008. *Plunder: When the Rule of Law is Illegal*. MA, Backwell.

From the above passage, it can be inferred that the progressive aspects of rule of law:

[Question ID = 2632]

1. were encouraged by Cold War politics. [Option ID = 10526]
2. were a reflection of American hegemony. [Option ID = 10525]
3. are false historically and in the present. [Option ID = 10527]
4. are a consequence of ideas of justice. [Option ID = 10528]

Correct Answer :-

- were encouraged by Cold War politics. [Option ID = 10526]

2)

The dominant image of the rule of law, we argue, is false historically and in the present, because it does not fully acknowledge its dark side. The false representation starts from the idea that good law (which others “lack”) is autonomous, separate from society and its institutions, technical, non-political, non-distributive, and reactive rather than proactive: more succinctly, a technological framework for an “efficient” market. Because of these false representations, good governance that ostensibly characterizes the law’s purposes becomes the backbone of naturalized professional arguments that are marshaled to legitimize plunder.

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Ugo Matei and Laura Nader 2008. *Plunder: When the Rule of Law is Illegal*. MA, Backwell.

Incentives for institutional virtues were high during the Cold War because:

[Question ID = 2634]

1. Profits were not as important before the 1990s. [Option ID = 10535]
2. of political empowerment that the ruling elites provided to rule of law. [Option ID = 10533]
3. Ruling elites had to persuade other countries that their system was better. [Option ID = 10534]
4. Justice was valued as a fundamental by the ruling elites. [Option ID = 10536]

Correct Answer :-

- Ruling elites had to persuade other countries that their system was better. [Option ID = 10534]

3)

The dominant image of the rule of law, we argue, is false historically and in the present, because it does not fully acknowledge its dark side. The false representation starts from the idea that good law (which others “lack”) is autonomous, separate from society and its institutions, technical, non-political, non-distributive, and reactive rather than proactive: more succinctly, a technological framework for an “efficient” market. Because of these false representations, good governance that ostensibly characterizes the law’s purposes becomes the backbone of naturalized professional arguments that are marshaled to legitimize plunder.

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Ugo Matei and Laura Nader 2008. *Plunder: When the Rule of Law is Illegal*. MA, Backwell.

The autonomy of law is seen in this passage as:

[Question ID = 2633]

1. a subaltern and naturalized image. [Option ID = 10532]
2. a dominant and unrealistic image. [Option ID = 10529]
3. a dominant and self-congratulatory image. [Option ID = 10531]
4. a dominant image that is no longer upheld. [Option ID = 10530]

Correct Answer :-

- a dominant and unrealistic image. [Option ID = 10529]

4)

The dominant image of the rule of law, we argue, is false historically and in the present, because it does not fully acknowledge its dark side. The false representation starts from the idea that good law (which others “lack”) is autonomous, separate from society and its institutions, technical, non-political, non-distributive, and reactive rather than proactive: more succinctly, a technological framework for an “efficient” market. Because of these false representations, good governance that ostensibly characterizes the law’s purposes becomes the backbone of naturalized professional arguments that are marshaled to legitimize plunder.

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Ugo Matei and Laura Nader 2008. *Plunder: When the Rule of Law is Illegal*. MA, Backwell.

The relationship between law and politics according to the passage above is:

[Question ID = 2635]

1. self-congratulatory rhetoric. [Option ID = 10539]
2. detrimental to the political soul of law. [Option ID = 10538]
3. fundamentally transforming for law. [Option ID = 10537]
4. has a dark and a bright side. [Option ID = 10540]

Correct Answer :-

- fundamentally transforming for law. [Option ID = 10537]

Topic:- DU_J18_MPHIL_SOCIO_Topic14

1)

Despite the statements about the cow's sacredness, most legal prohibitions are justified on economic grounds. Citing the Jan Sangh's anti cow-slaughter campaign in 1966-67, Christophe Jaffrelot says that the Hindutva groups have found it useful to base arguments that tie the sanctity of the cow with the economic utility of the animal (Jaffrelot 2008). The VHP in 1966 created the Sarvadaliya Goraksha Maha-Abhiyan Samiti (SGMS) in order to mobilize the Hindus and force the Congress-led government to reform the Constitution by making cow-slaughter illegal. The Jan Sangh, while supporting the VHP's campaign placed more emphasis on the economic aspect. According to Jaffrelot, the Jan Sangh's strategy is a clear indication that a simple argument based on religious sentiments is rarely enough for a large-scale mobilization (Jaffrelot 1993). An interesting anecdote quoted in Dr. Verghese Kurien's book, *I too had a Dream* complicates this assumption as well. Kurien says that in the years when he was trying to argue for disposing off old and dying cows so that there is always a young breed for the milk products industry in India, he befriended RSS ideologue M. S. Golwalker. One day in 1967, Golwalker asked him, "Kurien, shall I tell you why I'm making an issue of this cow slaughter business?" I said to him, 'Yes, please explain to me because otherwise you are a very intelligent man. Why are you doing this?' 'I started a petition to ban cow slaughter actually to embarrass the government,' he began explaining to me in private. Writing about the issue of cow slaughter, journalist and political analyst, Praful Bidwai pointed out several contradictions in the behaviour of Hindus about the notion of the 'sacredness' of the cow. He observed that even though the cow is held to be sacred by some and not all Hindus, very poor physical treatment is meted out to it, most of them are found in an emaciated condition after their productive years are over. Similarly, a large number of Hindus eat beef and many of them who own cattle seem to have a utilitarian attitude towards it (Bidwai 2003).

Elizabeth Thomas. 2013. Communities in Conflict: Fighting for the Sacred Cow *International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities* Vol. 2. Issue 1.

What does the passage reveal about Gowalkar's attitude towards the cow?

[Question ID = 2640]

1. He said that Hindus should not treat the cow as sacred. [Option ID = 10560]
2. He saw the cow as the wealth of the nation. [Option ID = 10558]
3. Gowalkar wanted to embarrass the government. [Option ID = 10559]
4. The cow had no significance for him. [Option ID = 10557]

Correct Answer :-

- Gowalkar wanted to embarrass the government. [Option ID = 10559]

2)

Despite the statements about the cow's sacredness, most legal prohibitions are justified on economic grounds. Citing the Jan Sangh's anti cow-slaughter campaign in 1966-67, Christophe Jaffrelot says that the Hindutva groups have found it useful to base arguments that tie the sanctity of the cow with the economic utility of the animal (Jaffrelot 2008). The VHP in 1966 created the Sarvadaliya Goraksha Maha-Abhiyan Samiti (SGMS) in order to mobilize the Hindus and force the Congress-led government to reform the Constitution by making cow-slaughter illegal. The Jan Sangh, while supporting the VHP's campaign placed more emphasis on the economic aspect. According to Jaffrelot, the Jan Sangh's strategy is a clear indication that a simple argument based on religious sentiments is rarely enough for a large-scale mobilization (Jaffrelot 1993). An interesting anecdote quoted in Dr. Verghese Kurien's book, *I too had a Dream* complicates this assumption as well. Kurien says that in the years when he was trying to argue for disposing off old and dying cows so that there is always a young breed for the milk products industry in India, he befriended RSS ideologue M. S. Golwalker. One day in 1967, Golwalker asked him, "Kurien, shall I tell you why I'm making an issue of this cow slaughter business?" I said to him, 'Yes, please explain to me because otherwise you are a very intelligent man. Why are you doing this?' 'I started a petition to ban cow slaughter actually to embarrass the government,' he began explaining to me in private. Writing about the issue of cow slaughter, journalist and political analyst, Praful Bidwai pointed out several contradictions in the behaviour of Hindus about the notion of the 'sacredness' of the cow. He observed that even though the cow is held to be sacred by some and not all Hindus, very poor physical treatment is meted out to it, most of them are found in an emaciated condition after their productive years are over. Similarly, a large number of Hindus eat beef and many of them who own cattle seem to have a utilitarian attitude towards it (Bidwai 2003).

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What are Dr. Kurien's views towards the cow?

[Question ID = 2639]

1. Dr Verghese Kurien did not believe in the sacred attributes of cows. [Option ID = 10553]
2. Dr. Verghese Kurien was a politician who promoted the purity of milk. [Option ID = 10555]
3. Dr. Verghese Kurien held that culling was necessary for the milk revolution. [Option ID = 10554]
4. None of these [Option ID = 10556]

Correct Answer :-

- Dr. Verghese Kurien held that culling was necessary for the milk revolution. [Option ID = 10554]

3)

Despite the statements about the cow's sacredness, most legal prohibitions are justified on economic grounds. Citing the Jan Sangh's anti cow-slaughter campaign in 1966-67, Christophe Jaffrelot says that the Hindutva groups have found it useful to base arguments that tie the sanctity of the cow with the economic utility of the animal (Jaffrelot 2008). The VHP in 1966 created the Sarvadaliya Goraksha Maha-Abhiyan Samiti (SGMS) in order to mobilize the Hindus and force the Congress-led government to reform the Constitution by making cow-slaughter illegal. The Jan Sangh, while supporting the VHP's campaign placed more emphasis on the economic aspect. According to Jaffrelot, the Jan Sangh's strategy is a clear indication that a simple argument based on religious sentiments is rarely enough for a large-scale mobilization (Jaffrelot 1993). An interesting anecdote quoted in Dr. Verghese Kurien's book, *I too had a Dream* complicates this assumption as well. Kurien says that in the years when he was trying to argue for disposing off old and dying cows so that there is always a young breed for the milk products industry in India, he befriended RSS ideologue M. S. Golwalker. One day in 1967, Golwalker asked him, "Kurien, shall I tell you why I'm making an issue of this cow slaughter business?" I said to him, 'Yes, please explain to me because otherwise you are a very intelligent man. Why are you doing this?' 'I started a petition to ban cow slaughter actually to embarrass the government,' he began explaining to me in private. Writing about the issue of cow slaughter, journalist and political analyst, Praful Bidwai pointed out several contradictions in the behaviour of Hindus about the notion of the 'sacredness' of the cow. He observed that even though the cow is held to be sacred by some and not all Hindus, very poor physical treatment is meted out to it, most of them are found in an emaciated condition after their productive years are over. Similarly, a large number of Hindus eat beef and many of them who own cattle seem to have a utilitarian attitude towards it (Bidwai 2003).

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For the Jan Sangh:

[Question ID = 2637]

1. the cow is a political icon. [Option ID = 10548]
2. the cow is a domestic animal. [Option ID = 10545]
3. the cow was primarily a ritual animal. [Option ID = 10547]
4. the ecology of cattle rearing is significant. [Option ID = 10546]

Correct Answer :-

- the ecology of cattle rearing is significant. [Option ID = 10546]

4)

Despite the statements about the cow's sacredness, most legal prohibitions are justified on economic grounds. Citing the Jan Sangh's anti cow-slaughter campaign in 1966-67, Christophe Jaffrelot says that the Hindutva groups have found it useful to base arguments that tie the sanctity of the cow with the economic utility of the animal (Jaffrelot 2008). The VHP in 1966 created the Sarvadaliya Goraksha Maha-Abhiyan Samiti (SGMS) in order to mobilize the Hindus and force the Congress-led government to reform the Constitution by making cow-slaughter illegal. The Jan Sangh, while supporting the VHP's campaign placed more emphasis on the economic aspect. According to Jaffrelot, the Jan Sangh's strategy is a clear indication that a simple argument based on religious sentiments is rarely enough for a large-scale mobilization (Jaffrelot 1993). An interesting anecdote quoted in Dr. Verghese Kurien's book, *I too had a Dream* complicates this assumption as well. Kurien says that in the years when he was trying to argue for disposing off old and dying cows so that there is always a young breed for the milk products industry in India, he befriended RSS ideologue M. S. Golwalker. One day in 1967, Golwalker asked him, "Kurien, shall I tell you why I'm making an issue of this cow slaughter business?" I said to him, 'Yes, please explain to me because otherwise you are a very intelligent man. Why are you doing this?' 'I started a petition to ban cow slaughter actually to embarrass the government,' he began explaining to me in private. Writing about the issue of cow slaughter, journalist and political analyst, Praful Bidwai pointed out several contradictions in the behaviour of Hindus about the notion of the 'sacredness' of the cow. He observed that even though the cow is held to be sacred by some and not all Hindus, very poor physical treatment is meted out to it, most of them are found in an emaciated condition after their productive years are over. Similarly, a large number of Hindus eat beef and many of them who own cattle seem to have a utilitarian attitude towards it (Bidwai 2003).

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What were the attitudes of the two organizations towards the cow?

[Question ID = 2638]

1. For the VHP the cow was a thought provoking animal. [Option ID = 10552]
2. The VHP refused to acknowledge the economic ecology of cattle rearing. [Option ID = 10551]
3. The VHP had no understanding of economic ecology of cattle rearing. [Option ID = 10550]
4. The Jan Sangh and the VHP did not agree on the sacred quality of the cow. [Option ID = 10549]

Correct Answer :-

- The VHP refused to acknowledge the economic ecology of cattle rearing. [Option ID = 10551]

Topic:- DU_J18_MPHIL_SOCIO_Topic15

1)

One of the fundamental effects of the orchestration of habitus is the production of a commonsense world endowed with the objectivity secured by consensus on the meaning of practices and the world, in other words the harmonization of agents' experiences and the continuous reinforcement that each of them receives from the expression, individual or collective (in festivals, for example), improvised or programmed (commonplaces, sayings), of similar or identical experiences. The homogeneity of habitus is what -- within the limits of the group of agents possessing the schemes (of production and interpretation) implied in their production -- causes practices and works to be immediately intelligible and foreseeable, and hence taken for granted. This practical comprehension obviates the "intention" and "intentional transfer into the Other" dear to the phenomenologists, by dispensing, for the ordinary occasions of life, with close analysis of the nuances of another's practice and tacit or explicit inquiry ("What do you mean?") into his intentions. Automatic and impersonal, significant without intending to signify, ordinary practices lend themselves to an understanding no less automatic and impersonal: the picking up of the objective intention they express in no way implies "reactivation" of the "lived" intention of the agent who performs them. "Communication of consciousnesses" presupposes community of "unconsciousnesses" (i.e. of linguistic and cultural competences). The deciphering of the objective intention of practices and works has nothing to do with the "reproduction"...of lived experiences and the reconstitution, unnecessary and uncertain, of the personal singularities of an intention" which is not their true origin.

Pierre Bourdieu. 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

According to Bourdieu, phenomenologists are interested in:

[Question ID = 2700]

1. practical comprehension. [Option ID = 10799]
2. personal singularities of an intention. [Option ID = 10800]
3. objective intentions of practices and works. [Option ID = 10797]
4. automatic and impersonal practices. [Option ID = 10798]

Correct Answer :-

- personal singularities of an intention. [Option ID = 10800]

2)

One of the fundamental effects of the orchestration of habitus is the production of a commonsense world endowed with the objectivity secured by consensus on the meaning of practices and the world, in other words the harmonization of agents' experiences and the continuous reinforcement that each of them receives from the expression, individual or collective (in festivals, for example), improvised or programmed (commonplaces, sayings), of similar or identical experiences. The homogeneity of habitus is what -- within the limits of the group of agents possessing the schemes (of production and interpretation) implied in their production -- causes practices and works to be immediately intelligible and foreseeable, and hence taken for granted. This practical comprehension obviates the "intention" and "intentional transfer into the Other" dear to the phenomenologists, by dispensing, for the ordinary occasions of life, with close analysis of the nuances of another's practice and tacit or explicit inquiry ("What do you mean?") into his intentions. Automatic and impersonal, significant without intending to signify, ordinary practices lend themselves to an understanding no less automatic and impersonal: the picking up of the objective intention they express in no way implies "reactivation" of the "lived" intention of the agent who performs them. "Communication of consciousnesses" presupposes community of "unconsciousnesses" (i.e. of linguistic and cultural competences). The deciphering of the objective intention of practices and works has nothing to do with the "reproduction"...of lived experiences and the reconstitution, unnecessary and uncertain, of the personal singularities of an intention" which is not their true origin.

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Habitus produces commonsense world endowed with objectivity, by

[Question ID = 2698]

1. continuous reinforcement of meaning interpreted schemes. [Option ID = 10790]
2. harmonizing agents' experiences. [Option ID = 10789]
3. securing consensus on the meaning of practices. [Option ID = 10791]
4. All of these [Option ID = 10792]

Correct Answer :-

- securing consensus on the meaning of practices. [Option ID = 10791]

3)

One of the fundamental effects of the orchestration of habitus is the production of a commonsense world endowed with the objectivity secured by consensus on the meaning of practices and the world, in other words the harmonization of agents' experiences and the continuous reinforcement that each of them receives from the expression, individual or collective (in festivals, for example), improvised or programmed (commonplaces, sayings), of similar or identical experiences. The homogeneity of habitus is what -- within the limits of the group of agents possessing the schemes (of production and interpretation) implied in their production -- causes practices and works to be immediately intelligible and foreseeable, and hence taken for granted. This practical comprehension obviates the "intention" and "intentional transfer into the Other" dear to the phenomenologists, by dispensing, for the ordinary occasions of life, with close analysis of the nuances of another's practice and tacit or explicit inquiry ("What do you mean?") into his intentions. Automatic and impersonal, significant without intending to signify, ordinary practices lend themselves to an understanding no less automatic and impersonal: the picking up of the objective intention they express in no way implies "reactivation" of the "lived" intention of the agent who performs them. "Communication of consciousnesses" presupposes community of "unconsciousnesses" (i.e. of linguistic and cultural competences). The deciphering of the objective intention of practices and works has nothing to do with the "reproduction"...of lived experiences and the reconstitution, unnecessary and uncertain, of the personal singularities of an intention" which is not their true origin.

Pierre Bourdieu. 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Homogeneity of habitus enables:

[Question ID = 2699]

1. limiting the group of agents processing the schemes of production and interpretation of habitus. [Option ID = 10793]
2. making practices and works to be immediately intelligible and foreseeable. [Option ID = 10794]
3. deconstructing an agent's taken for granted intentions. [Option ID = 10795]
4. All of these [Option ID = 10796]

Correct Answer :-

- making practices and works to be immediately intelligible and foreseeable. [Option ID = 10794]
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